Twelve key points
The main thrust of the 2013 White Paper: Twelve key points and new orientations

1 – Confirm the concept of national security

The national security strategy intends to allow France to ward off risks and threats, direct or indirect, likely to endanger the life of the Nation. This concept, introduced by the 2008 White Paper and enshrined in law in 2009, has been confirmed. It is grounded in recognising the continuity of the internal and external threats menacing France, its territory, population and security interests. It enables us to assess all the different dimensions of these threats and organise our response to them, at the national level, by mobilising the entire apparatus of the State, the armed forces and the internal and civil security forces, together with the resources of decentralised local and regional government and the main operators of vital importance for the country.

2 – Fine-tune the analysis of threats compared with the 2008 White Paper

The level of threat and the climate of uncertainty characterising our international environment since 2008 have not diminished. Our analysis must now take three phenomena into consideration:

• «Threats related to power.» The risk of a resurgence of conflicts between States remains plausible within the 2025 time frame: the rise in military spending, particularly in Asia; power politics (Russia, China); regional destabilisation (Middle East); proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and the consequences thereof; cyber attacks instigated by States, etc.

• «Risks related to weakness»: certain weak or failed States can become a threat. This strategic phenomenon is taking on a new dimension. When certain States prove incapable of exercising their responsibilities, the risks and threats that crystallise in their territory can rapidly spill over and undermine our own security. We are referring here to failed States in Africa, the Middle East and Asia which require a response from and the involvement of the international community, particularly the United Nations.

• «Threats and risks intensified by globalisation»: they include threats and risks to the ever-increasing flow of goods, merchandise and people resulting from economic globalisation; the risks to maritime security with the spectacular increase in piracy; the risks of terrorism, which are still an extremely important security preoccupation in most countries; the exponential increase in risks to digital infrastructure through cyber attacks and potential threats in outer space. All these security threats are intensified by globalisation.

The 2013 classification of the priority threats facing the territory, the population and French nationals abroad to be addressed by the defence and national security strategy are:

• aggression by another State against the national territory;
• terrorist attacks;
• cyber attacks;
• attacks on our scientific and technical potential;
• organised crime in its most serious manifestations;
• major crises arising on the national territory and resulting from natural, health, technological, industrial and accidental risks;
• attacks on French nationals abroad.
3 – Adapt geostrategic priorities to the new international environment

The White Paper clearly sets forth the geostrategic priorities resulting from our duty to protect French citizens, on the one hand, and assume our international responsibilities, on the other:

- protect the national territory and French nationals abroad, guarantee the continuity of the Nation’s essential functions, preserve our sovereignty, in mainland France and the overseas territories;
- guarantee the security of Europe and the North Atlantic space, with our partners and allies, by playing an active role in the European Union and NATO;
- stabilise Europe’s near environment, with our partners and allies, notably to guard against weakness-related threats in the event of crises likely to jeopardise Europe’s eastern approaches, the Mediterranean region or Africa. A distinguishing characteristic of the 2013 White Paper is the importance placed on the African continent;
- in the Middle East and the Arabo-Persian Gulf, implement the defence agreements entered into by France and jointly, with its allies, protect its security and strategic interests;
- contribute to peace and international security in the world, more particularly in the Indian Ocean, Asia and South America.

4 – Take into consideration both the continuing existence of threats and the constraints related to public finances

In 2013, the defence and national security strategy must reconcile two contradictory factors: a level of risk and threats similar to that identified in 2008 and radical constraints on spending due to the urgent need today to restore public finances.

To solve this equation, the White Paper combines the determination to give the country the means to assume all its defence and security responsibilities, an adapted strategy, and the promotion a long-term vision.

Four major orientations should allow us to address this issue:

- maintenance of a substantial defence effort, as decided by the President of the Republic: defence spending in the next few years will initially be stabilised in terms of value and then progressively raised in terms of volume, thereby reflecting the singular place of defence in the general trajectory of public finances. A total of €179.2 billion [2013 value] will be devoted to defence between 2014 and 2019, and €364 billion between 2014 and 2025. The French defence budget will continue to be the second largest military budget in the European Union. It represents the price to be paid to maintain France’s ambitions and preserve its strategic autonomy.
- recognition of the industrial imperative: the President of the Republic has chosen to preserve all the critical industrial sectors that make our industrial and technological base an instrument for preserving France’s strategic autonomy and its sovereignty. It implies a continued priority over the period covered by the White Paper in favour of research and development spending and investment to equip our forces looking to 2025. This equipment investment will enable modernisation, true at a slower pace than provided for in the previous programme, but sufficient to ensure upgrading of all the critical capabilities our armed forces require and respect clearly established priorities in favour of deterrence, intelligence and power projection capabilities.
- definition of an efficient armed forces model to respond to the most predictable threats and risks: this model intends to make best use of our military capabilities by applying a principle of differentiation - whereby the most costly resources are directed where they are most essential, in accordance with the different types of engagement of the armed forces - and a principle of pooling scarce and critical capabilities that can be allocated to the different missions (deterrence, protection or intervention) or shared with our principal European partners (airlift, in-flight refuelling, naval aviation capability, etc.) or between services (technical intelligence).
- a clearly stated European dynamic enabling us to capitalise fully on our alliances: the White Paper describes both France’s determination to promote a pragmatic overhaul of the European defence policy, which promises the best synergies for common security, and its intention
to play an active role within the Atlantic Alliance to ensure the continued transformation of its organisation, serving more efficient defence and military operations.

5 – Capitalising on France’s full engagement in NATO

The White Paper on defence and national security takes on board the findings of the mission entrusted by the President of the Republic to Mr Hubert Védrine. It therefore recognises that the Atlantic Alliance is an essential component of the defence and national security strategy. France therefore intends to capitalise on its full participation in the military structures of NATO. It will play an active role in this structure through the responsibilities it will assume at all levels of command, likewise through its contribution to operations and the vision it intends to promote of the role of this military alliance. Within the Atlantic Alliance and thanks to the defence effort France agrees to provide, our country will retain its identity and its autonomy, likewise its capacity to assume its place in command and wield influence over planning, policy and strategy. This vision, coordinated with its project for Europe, will allow it to retain its freedom of decision and action while at the same time contributing to the allies’ joint effort and solidarity. It also intends to play a very active role in the process of overhauling NATO’s means of action.

6 – A pragmatic revitalisation of the European defence policy

The 2013 White Paper lays emphasis on the fact that France and its European partners share a common destiny. Building a European defence and security policy will therefore be a strong pillar of France’s strategy. A pragmatic revitalisation of the Common Security and Defence Policy is necessary, in a context marked both by the critical financial situation of several European countries and the pivot of US policy towards Asia.

France considers that the European countries must be able to define common security interests essential to the Union. It proposes drawing up a European Union White Paper on defence and security, as an opportunity to express a global political ambition shared by the Member States. It recommends that the revitalisation strongly advocated by France be enshrined in specific decisions of the European Council, that it compensate for the Union’s inadequacies in terms of external operations, foster development and pooling of the most essential military capabilities for the most plausible operations and encourage consolidation of the European defence industry. This project goes hand in hand with continued efforts to build a European internal security policy.

7 – Remodelling general strategy and military strategy

1. General strategy: The 2013 White Paper sets out a new relationship between three priority missions defined by the President of the Republic: protection of the territory and the population, nuclear deterrence and intervention by the armed forces outside the national territory. Protection is the first pillar of our defence and national security strategy, but it cannot be guaranteed without our capability for deterrence and intervention. Nuclear deterrence aims to protect us from any aggression against our vital interests emanating from a State, wherever it may come from and whatever form it may take. Intervention gives the security of France the strategic depth, outside its territory, that is of vital importance. It also reinforces the credibility of our deterrence capability. These three priority missions are therefore highly complementary. On this basis, the White Paper restates the five strategic functions identified in 2008 – i.e. knowledge and anticipation, deterrence, protection, prevention and intervention - that contribute to these three priority missions, which it confirms and redefines in accordance with developments occurring since 2008.

2. Military strategy: Before the 2013 White Paper, the French armed forces were primarily dimensioned and organised on the hypothesis of a major, high-intensity confrontation with State-led forces of an equivalent level. The 2008 White Paper laid particular emphasis on the principle of versatility and top-level modernisation of all units. The 2013 White Paper introduces a change in this approach. In keeping with the analysis of power-related threats and weakness-related threats, it distinguishes between coercive operations in which our forces are likely to confront State-led armed forces, and crisis management operations, which have
different military characteristics. As a function of these elements and the broader aspects of the strategic context, it sets forth four guiding principles for the new armed forces model:
a) strategic autonomy, which is key to freedom of decision and action and to France’s capacity to take the initiative in operations it may deem necessary, likewise to wield influence in a multinational coalition in which it might be engaged;
b) the consistency of the model with the diversity of possible engagement by our forces in conflicts and crises, i.e. the capacity to engage in coercive and initial-entry operations in a theatre of war, crisis management operations in all the varying forms they make take today and in actions required to protect our security interests over the whole spectrum of the most probable military missions;
c) differentiation of forces, which consists of distinguishing between them as a function of the types of missions they are required to perform – deterrence, protection, crisis management, coercion and war operations. It is also a principle of economy, since it advocates using the most costly capabilities only in situations where they are the most essential, and of relative specialisation of forces;
d) pooling, which will give us the capacity to allocate a core of multi-role, scarce and technologically high-level capabilities to several missions [protection, deterrence and intervention]; this principle also entails pooling some of the most sophisticated technical resources between the different intelligence services. Lastly, it has a European dimension, in that we will seek to pool major operational capabilities [aerial, in-flight refuelling, naval aviation capability, satellites etc.] with our European partners.

8 – Build a new armed forces model

a) Based on the principles set forth, the White Paper defines, first of all, the main operational contracts assigned by the Head of State to our armed forces. These contracts enable them to conduct a broad spectrum of engagements and include permanent missions on the one hand, and non-permanent missions entailing intervention outside our borders, on the other. They state that the armed forces must have the capacity to:
• conduct the deterrence mission, based on two components;
• perform missions of protection of the territory and the population, implying the capabilities required to protect land, air and sea approaches and confirming a land forces capability of up to 10,000 troops, together with the relevant resources of the naval and air forces, in support of the interior security forces;
• engage in international crisis management, where necessary in three theatres, with resources including up to 7,000 troops, naval units including a combined support and command vessel group (BPC) and approximately 12 fighter aircraft;
• lastly, engage in a major coercive operation involving the special forces, up to two combat brigades representing approximately 15,000 land troops, 45 fighter aircraft and a naval aviation group.

b) The new armed forces model required to generate these forces is based, first, on a set of high-level capabilities enabling us to guarantee our means of command, planning and decision making. The armed forces will retain the capacity to set up command structures for the land, sea and air components on the level of an army brigade or equivalent. Intelligence capabilities will be developed as a priority, with a greater effort to modernise human resources and upgrade our technical imaging and electromagnetic interception resources, whether space-based, air, naval or land.

For the first time, the armed forces model includes military cyber defence capabilities, in close liaison with intelligence and defensive and offensive planning, in preparation for or support of military operations.

The Special Forces will be reinforced, in terms of personnel, command capabilities and their capacity to coordinate with the intelligence services; the joint dimension of the COS [special operations command] will also be strengthened.

The land forces will rely on a land-based operational force of around 66,000 deployable troops including, apart from back-up and operational support, seven joint brigades: two brigades trained for coercive combat, three multi-purpose brigades, two light brigades; 200 heavy tanks, 250 median tanks, 115 utility helicopters, 140 reconnaissance and attack helicopters and some 30 tactical drones.
The naval forces will rely on the FOST [strategic oceanic force], with its four nuclear-powered, ballistic missile-carrying submarines (SSBN), high-level combat capabilities for high-intensity operations and major crisis management missions, with an aircraft carrier, six nuclear-powered attack submarines, three combined support and command vessels (BPC) and 15 frontline frigates, including air defence frigates, multi-mission frigates and less powerful combat units, notably Lafayette-type frigates with sonar capabilities. They will be supplemented by lighter units capable of controlling maritime spaces: 15 patrol boats, six surveillance frigates and support vessels. They will also include naval patrol aircraft and a mine-laying capability to protect our approaches and for deployment in external operations.

The air forces will deploy the airborne component of the deterrence mission. They will have the capacity for initial entry in war operations, deep-penetration strikes and support for ground manoeuvres, on the one hand, and to conduct crisis management missions or missions to protect national air space or approaches, on the other. Their transport capability will be upgraded and they will make a strong contribution to surveillance and intelligence in crisis or engagement zones. To this end, they will dispose of 225 fighter aircraft (air and naval), some 50 tactical transport aircraft, some 12 multi-role refuelling aircraft, 12 theatre surveillance drones, seven detection and aerial surveillance aircraft and a fleet of light surveillance aircraft.

9 – Cyber defence: a new strategic context

The 2013 White Paper marks a crucial new stage in recognition of cyber threats and development of cyber defence capabilities. It takes note of the growing vulnerability of the State and society to increasingly dangerous attacks: attempts to penetrate networks for purposes of espionage, remote takeover, paralysis and, in the near future, destruction of infrastructure of vital importance, or even weapons systems and strategic military capabilities.

The White Paper therefore provides for a strategic stance aimed at identifying the origin of attacks, organising the resilience of the Nation and responding to attacks, including use of offensive cyber capabilities. France will ensure that it has the capacity to guarantee autonomous production of security systems, reinforce the human resources devoted to cyber defence and enhance the reliability of State and major operator information systems. In the field of defence, a unified chain of command will be developed and strengthened to respond to the surge in threats. Lastly, an operational reserve and a citizen reserve for cyber defence will be set up to enhance the country’s resilience.

10 – Giving priority to intelligence

The White Paper introduces a new dimension in terms of the priority placed on intelligence. Its central role will be reaffirmed, over and above solely military or strictly security requirements and to the benefit of the other four strategic functions. Its governance will be improved by strengthening the role of the National Intelligence Coordinator reporting to the President of the Republic, extending the role of the parliamentary delegation to enable Parliament to exercise its control over government policy in this area and publicly disclosing a national intelligence strategy.

The White Paper emphasizes the importance of the resources to be allocated to interior intelligence in the next few years. It also provides for a major global investment effort bearing in particular on: the space and air components of imaging and electromagnetic interception; diversification of sensors, notably with drones, light surveillance aircraft and payloads on air, naval or land platforms; the resources devoted to cyber defence, and technical interception resources adapted to the speed of digital development. In addition, to make best use of this equipment, the White Paper establishes a principle of pooling the most costly technical resources between the intelligence services, under the supervision of the National Coordinator.
11 – Recognising the mission of defence personnel and promoting their rights

The reforms conducted since 2008 have led to radical changes both in terms of territory and organisation, which have often impacted on the living conditions and morale of the men and women serving our defence. The White Paper emphasises the fact that particular attention will be paid to the conditions under which future changes will be managed, while respecting the efforts already made and individual rights. This process entails recognising the full citizenship status of military personnel, while taking into account their singular missions and in accordance with the particular rules governing this status. They must therefore be able to benefit from general social trends creating personal rights, notably where they allow them to better reconcile the demands of professional and private life, encourage self-expression and modernise conditions of consultation and dialogue in the defence community.

In consequence, governance of human resources will be overhauled to ensure overall consistency and consultation within the Ministry of Defence. New instruments will be put in place to this end (permanent liaison group with the Minister, cooperative tools of expression to serve consultation, implementation of the Bercy agreements and continued rollout of the social agenda in the framework of rich and respectful dialogue with civil personnel). The decisions made in 2008 and the Military Programme Act passed in 2009 provided for elimination of 55,000 positions between 2009 and 2015, of which over 10,000 in 2014-2015. In the next six years, the Ministry of Defence will be implementing these decisions and will embark on further downsizing, albeit much more moderate, in accordance with the new operational contracts approved by the President of the Republic, to comply with the requirement to reduce public spending and meet commitments to rationalise public administration. This second reduction will concern approximately 24,000 personnel. All in all, between 2014 and 2019, the Ministry of Defence must therefore reduce its workforce by around 34,000, excluding outsourcing.

A further system of social and economic support for these changes will be developed in the Military Programme Act (LPM).

Lastly, the 2013 White Paper stresses the importance of the reserves and the defence mindset.

12 – The industrial imperative

The White Paper recognises the defence industry as an essential component of France’s strategic autonomy. With 4,000 companies, revenues of almost €15 billion and around 165,000 direct and indirect jobs in France, the defence industry, which exports from 25% to 40% of its output, is a driver of competitiveness for the French economy and employment. Its position will therefore be preserved. The President of the Republic has deemed it essential to maintain a substantial volume of public credits to guarantee preservation of crucial expertise in key sectors identified by the Ministry of Defence and the Ministry of Industrial Renewal.

This priority is also reflected by the importance placed, in the armed forces model, on studies and research to secure future capability: this funding will be maintained at the present level throughout the 2014-2025 period.

This proactive policy will be accompanied by firm State support for companies (including SMEs) in the field of exports, while respecting our commitments in terms of control. In this area, it will foster partnerships with the principal customers. The European dimension of the government’s strategy will include a crucial industrial component. France will take initiatives here in the framework of preparation for the European Council meeting of December 2013. It will promote common frameworks to support shared technological and industrial capabilities, relying in particular on the French-British experience in missiles, based on the principle of freely agreed interdependencies. Furthermore, France will encourage exploitation of the potentialities of the European Defence Agency (EDA) and the organisation for joint armament cooperation (OCCAR).